# Pathways to Trump: Republican Primary Voters in 2016

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# Abstract

The candidacy of Donald Trump has drawn considerable social science interest as a way to understand the interplay between attitudinal explanations, covariates, and momentum. In particular, arguments about the working class, personality, race, populism and Trump's domination of the media serve as competing (but not mutually exclusive) explanations for Trump's electoral success. In this paper we rely upon a unique monthly panel dataset to explore changing support for Republican presidential candidates over the primary season, test competing theories regarding the attitudinal shifts that propelled the Trump candidacy forward, and evaluate the influence of perceptions of success that respondents held about Trump and the decision to support him during the primaries.

# Introduction

The candidacy of Donald Trump for the Republican nomination for president began in June 2015 with an announcement from Trump Tower in New York. His candidacy was distinctive, if not entirely unique, in several ways. Trump had not run for public office before, he promised to self-fund his campaign, and he had declared himself a candidate for the Reform Party's presidential nomination in 1999, announced that he was a Democrat in 2004, and affiliated with the Republicans for the first time in 2009. He toyed with the idea of running for the 2012 Republican nomination but dropped the effort in mid-2011. In his 2015 announcement, he emphasized the themes of offshoring jobs and trade deals that ran counter to longstanding Republican orthodoxy, but he also highlighted the issues of immigration, national debt, and Islamic terrorism. His promise to build a wall across the border with Mexico originated in that speech.

The electoral coalition that emerged to support Donald Trump's presidential candidacy surprised many observers of American politics. He was considered too unprepared for a presidential campaign and the presidency, out of the mainstream of Republican opinion on key issues, and too unconventional in style and rhetoric to fit his party. Yet, he won in a manner similar to other successful Republican nominees. He started the primary season as a frontrunner and then, with a few stumbles, expanded his base of support within the party, acquired double the number of delegates of his closest competitor by mid-March, and then steadily added the delegates required to win the nomination.

In this paper, we evaluate popular claims about Trump supporters–that they were working class whites with at least somewhat authoritarian, racist, and populist attitudes–and how his electoral coalition expanded over the election cycle. Trump's support emerged in stages: the pre-primary supporters and supporters drawn to him during the primary season

between January and May.[1] Popular commentary emphasizes that working class whites were a critical and early component of Trump's support, but the gradual and incomplete acquisition of support from other Republicans deserves examination. We consider who moved to Trump through the major stages of the nomination process, test popular conceptions of the factors that drew Republican voters to Trump, and observe how electoral momentum and the winnowing of candidates fed supporters to Trump and his major competitors.

## The Trump Candidacy

Trump became an early leader while emphasizing positions on trade and immigration issues that were not shared by most Republican elites at the start of the campaign. In doing so, his campaign took the party away from the usual pattern in which differences in issue emphasis, but not differences in issue position, differentiate candidates competing for a party's nomination (Aldrich and Alvarez 1994, Norpoth and Perkins 2011). Trump was not an instant hit but not too far from it. By August 7, his Real Clear Politics average showed him at double the support of the second place candidate, Jeb Bush (24 percent to 12 percent), with Scott Walker, Mike Huckabee, Ben Carson, Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz, John Kasich, and others trailing. With the exception of Carson for a week or so in November 2015, no other candidate matched his national support among Republicans for the duration of 2015 and the 2016 primary season. We plot nationally-representative survey opinion data for Trump and the other candidates in Figure 1. The winnowing of candidates by April 2016 left Cruz and Kasich in the race, but Cruz peaked 6 or 7 percentage points behind Trump in late March and

[1]In a supplementary analysis that may be found in the Appendix, we examine the general election supporters who arrived in his camp only after he became the presumptive winner of the nomination.

Kasich remained behind Cruz.[2] Looking at this figure, it appears Trump's popular support increased nearly monotonically over the course of the campaign, with no clear challenger emerging from the Republican field. Yet, many pundits (and political scientists) remained perplexed by Trump's continued success. In particular, Trump's willingness to establish distance from the Republican National Committee demonstrated he relied upon voters, not traditional party elites (Cohen et al. 2008).

**Figure 1.** Support for Candidates Among Republican Primary Voters, 2015-2016, by Month




[2]For a summary of polls, see `http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2016/president/us/2016_republican_presidential_nomination-3823.html`.

Even with his early and substantial lead, many observers considered Trump's candidacy to be doomed to failure. In the last quarter of 2015, Trump's support settled in the range of 25-30 percent among registered Republicans, which left a majority of Republicans supporting other candidates. As a non-traditional Republican, it was argued, Trump would eventually lose to another Republican (Bush, Rubio, Cruz, or Kasich) who would accumulate support from voters whose favorite candidates dropped out of the race. Instead, Trump's support among Republicans exhibited a 5-10 percent improvement in the first two months of 2016 and eventually climbed even higher in March. Trump became the presumptive winner, but not a consensus winner, in April and effectively clinched the nomination when Cruz lost the Indiana primary in early May. While none of Trump's competitors caught up with him in the polls or delegate count, he had acquired the support of less than half of registered- or likely-voter Republicans for the nomination by mid-May.

## Claims about the Trump Electorate

During the pre-primary months, commentators, pollsters, and scholars made a variety of claims about the the sources of Trump's support. The major claims were that Trump's core support came from working class whites with at least somewhat authoritarian, racist, and populist attitudes. These claims warrant brief discussion.

First, the dominant theme of most popular accounts of early Trump support was his support among working class whites, particularly among men. A syndrome of lost manufacturing jobs and downward mobility, pessimism about the future of their children, rising income inequality, and declining health and life expectancy made the Trump message appealing (e.g. Case and Deaton 2015).[3] Survey data during the primary and general election

[3] http://www.prri.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/PRRI-AVS-2015-Web.pdf; http:

campaigns and the surge in turnout in certain counties appear to confirm this theme.[4] Working class whites gave Trump a wave of support from outside the usual Republican primary electorate and, because of their policy views and social values, created strategic problems for traditional Republican candidates. Elements of this narrative were age and education: Trump's appeal was strongest to middle aged Americans with less than a college education who filled the ranks of the working class. These themes were not new to social scientists (Teixeira and Rogers 2000, Zweig 2000), but they became central to popular commentary in 2015 and 2016.

Second, a handful of political scientists had a hunch that Trump appealed to individuals of a certain personality type, those attracted to authoritarian leadership. Extreme views–for example, support for banning Muslims–seemed to run high among Trump supporters. In one report, location on an authoritarianism scale had a significant discriminating effect among Republicans in their support for Trump.[5] In this view, Trump was appealing to a type of individual that desires strong leaders, divides the world into us versus them, demands obedience to widely accepted norms of behavior, has an aversion to new experi-

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//www.pewtrusts.org/en/archived-projects/economic-mobility-project

[4]https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/white-working-class-men-increasingly
2016/10/05/95610130-8a51-11e6-875e-2c1bfe943b66_story.html?
utm_term=.fb8ed79e1ea1; http://files.kff.org/attachment/
Report-Kaiser-Family-Foundation-CNN-Working-Class-Whites-Poll; http://www.cnn.
com/2016/09/20/politics/2016-election-white-working-class-voters/; http://www.
economist.com/news/united-states/21709596-support-donald-trump-working-class-whites-not-wh
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/28/upshot/a-2016-review-turnout-wasnt-the-driver-of-clinto
html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=
first-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=1

[5]http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/01/donald-trump-2016-authoritarian-213533.

ences, and responds aggressively to outsiders who are perceived as threats (Hetherington and Weiler 2009).[6] This interpretation was contested by Rahn and Oliver, based on a survey conducted in mid-March 2016.[7]

Third, other observers emphasized Trump's appeal to ethnic and racial resentments among whites.[8] In fact, the Clinton campaign openly referred to Trump's campaign of prejudice and paranoia, which probably was intended to cover Trump's views on undocumented immigrants, refugees, Muslims, Hispanics, and perhaps others, in addition to attitudes about African Americans.[9] Trump's candidacy, in this account, exploited ethnic and racial sensitivities to develop his initial base of support.

Fourth, observers emphasized Trump's populism. The populist theme–"the little guy versus big business and big government"–underpinned Trump's emphasis on changing trade and immigration policies. With Trump's emphasis on tax cuts, government regulation, and social values, this was a conservative brand of populism that some observers struggled to define. Nevertheless, the trade and immigration themes of the Trump platform pitted

[6]For more discussion of authoritarianism and Trump support, see http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-weiler/understanding-trump---its_b_11338384.html; http://www.vox.com/2016/3/1/11127424/trump-authoritarianism; https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/donald-trumps-authoritarian-politics-of-memory/514004/

[7]https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/09/trumps-voters-arent-authoritarians-new-research-says-so-what-are-they/?utm_term=.1e1678028796

[8]https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/11/22/peoples-views-about-race-mattered-more-in-electing-trump-than-in-electing-obama/?utm_term=.e6cbf54256ca

[9]http://www.vox.com/2016/9/12/12882796/trump-supporters-racist-deplorables

Trump against long-standing Republican policy positions and appealed to non-traditional Republicans.[10]

Fifth, Trump was unique for his ability to dominate the media, as the media told us repeatedly during the primary season.[11] While Trump self-funded much of this nomination campaign, it was noted, he benefited from free media coverage of his events, comments, and Tweets and frequent appearances on television programs. He spent relatively small sums on campaign organization and paid advertising. This was unique among frontrunners in modern presidential campaigns. Media domination surely gave Trump the means to reinforce his campaign themes and advertise his personal qualities at little cost.

Trump's media advantage may have played an important role in minimizing the momentum that other candidates acquired by their performance, particularly in the first half of the primary season. Momentum, or the bandwagon effect, refers to a process in which winning primaries and caucuses changes perceptions of the candidates (Bartels 1988, Norrander 2006, Steger 2008). Winning, particularly when it involves performing better than expected in primaries and caucuses, stimulates more donations, more spending, and more media attention, and, in turn, generates more support. Moreover, voters are affected in cognitive and emotional ways that lead them to support winners in a way that goes beyond turning to their most favored candidate on policy or ideological grounds. As a rule, momentum is not associated with a front runner for whom expectations of winning are already strong, but in Trump's case the expectation that he would falter in the early contests and failed to do so may have brought more attention than usual and squeezed out coverage of his competitors. In fact, his outlandish statements about his competitors seemed to do little harm to his

[10] http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/03/donald-trump-the-perfect-populist-21369

[11] https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/16/upshot/measuring-donald-trumps-mammoth-advantage-in-
html?_r=0

cause among Republican voters, at least on net, and kept media attention on him.

We might add a sixth observation: Many Republicans did not like Trump. Some Republican elites took extraordinary steps in an attempt to stop Trump–most notably, Mitt Romney's blistering speech condemning Trump on March 2–and others refused or were very slow to endorse him. In the fall of 2016, as the media emphasized repeatedly, a majority of Americans rated both Clinton and Trump unfavorably, with Trump suffering lower ratings than Clinton.[12] Left unexamined in this mass of commentary about disliked candidates is whether Trump changed minds about his suitability for the presidency.

Plainly, the arguments about the working class, personality, race, and populism, and even Trump's domination of the media, are not identifying mutually exclusive groups or processes. In fact, Inglehart and Norris (2016) tie the populism to a cultural backlash that is rooted in social values that is akin to the authoritarian and racial dimensions that others have emphasized. In this account, populism is one pole of a continuum and opposite to "cosmopolitan" values, which include multiculturalism, diversity, openness, and inclusiveness (Jackman and Vavreck 2011). Other interpretations emphasize "white populism" and similar concepts that refer to a backlash to social change, external threats, and challenges to white identity that make a combination of populistic, authoritarian, and race-based themes appealing to many Americans.[13]

If these arguments about Trump's distinctive or core support account for his standing

[12] http://www.langerresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/1144-59ClintonTrumpFavorability.pdf;http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2016/08/31/poll-clinton-trump-most-unfavorable-candidates-ever/89644296/;http://www.salon.com/2016/10/06/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-popularity/

[13] https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/02/world/americas/brexit-donald-trump-whites.html

at the start of the primary season, they may not account for his success in expanding his base over the course of the primary season in the first half of 2016. In that period, his competitors dropped out of the race and their supporters gradually moved to Trump and the remaining candidates. On March 15, the day of the Florida, Illinois, North Carolina, Ohio, and other primaries, Trump won 228 delegates, giving him over half of the delegates needed to win the nomination and leaving only Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz, and John Kasich with any chance of overtaking him. Kasich was not in the picture as the primary season began, and Cruz showed steady growth in support as candidates dropped out.

By late March, Trump's standing in the polls had risen to the mid-40s. Little is known about the kind of support–about 20 percent of Republicans–that Trump attracted during the primary season between January and May. By May, when the last standing candidates with Cruz, Kasich, and Trump, a majority of Republicans supported one of the other candidates. Cruz was a very conservative, Tea Party-oriented candidate; Kasich was a more traditional conservative and stylishly moderate candidate. Republicans appeared to have winnowed the field to three distinctive alternatives. Much of the commentary about the state of play in the late Republican race is captured by these observations made a few months later by FiveThirtyEight's Harry Enten but long before Cruz endorsed Trump:

> *There seem to be two main camps of Republican opposition to Trump. One, embodied by Kasich, objects to Trump on experiential and temperamental grounds Trump is playing to cultural grievances on issues such as immigration, and the Kasich camp wants a more inclusive GOP. The other, embodied by Cruz, objects to Trump on ideological grounds he's not a conservative, they argue.*[14]

Cruz eventually endorsed Trump; Kasich did not. Dislike of Trump persisted, at least among some elite and rank-and-file Republicans.

This suggests that attitudes among Cruz and Kasich supporters persisted into the

[14] http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-most-anti-trump-voters-look-a-lot-like-kasich-

summer of 2016 but it does not offer a clue about the 20 percent or so of Republicans who shifted to Trump by May. We are left asking whether other factors associated with momentum in the political science literature underlie the pro-Trump shift during the January-May period.

## Data and Methods

Our central concern is the evolving composition of the Trump coalition during 2015 and 2016. We exploit The American Panel Survey (TAPS) to trace the candidate preferences of Republican primary and general election voters and test the fit of popular accounts of the Trump candidacy.[15] Panel data allow us to determine whether the major elements of the Trump story (working class, authoritarianism, racism, populism) help to account for

[15]The survey was started in December of 2011 by Knowledge Networks (now GfK Knowledge Networks). The sampling frame used to select the 2,000 respondents is the U.S. Postal Service's computerized delivery sequence file (CDSF), which covers around 97% of the physical addresses in all fifty states including P.O. boxes and rural route addresses. This frame is appended with information regarding household residents' names, demographic characteristics of the inhabitants, and landline telephone numbers obtained from other sources such as the U.S. Census files and commercial data bases (such as white pages). The respondents are recruited based on a random stratified sample, where Hispanics and young adults between 18 and 24 years of age are slightly oversampled in order to account for their tendency to under-respond to surveys. Those individuals without internet access are provided with a computer and internet access. More technical information about the survey is available at `http://taps.wustl.edu`. Upon entering the panel, each panelist completes a profile survey comprised of key demographic indicators. At the beginning of each month, members of the panel receive a notification to complete the new survey. Each wave remains open for approximately one month and takes between 15 and 25 minutes to complete. Such breadth of data provides researchers with a unique opportunity to investigate trends and changes at the individual level. For example, if an individual remains active in the panel for two years, TAPS collects over 1,000 variables at 24 different points in time for one individual. Such design invites investigation of individual-level change over both the

Trump's early support and explain willingness to shift to Trump during the primary and general election seasons. Both changes in cross-sectional correlates in Trump support and propensity to shift to Trump yield insights about the emergence of a winning coalition.

In Figure 2, we show a "riverplot" of the Republican primary and caucus voters generated by TAPS. The width of the lines is proportionate to the number of panelists who supported each candidate in each monthly wave. The "tributaries" depict the flow of panelists from one wave to the next. The figure shows considerable stability in candidate preferences in the period before the first delegate selection events in February.

A few features of the 2015-2016 flow are worth noting. Ben Carson picked up support during the fall months of 2015 and then lost strength, with his support going to Cruz and Rubio more than to Trump. Rubio gradually expanded his support until his weak performances in February, when his support went to Cruz and Kasich more than to Trump. Trump, notably, gradually acquired support from many places – small streams from voters who initially supported someone else. In no month during the primary season did he win most of the support of the candidates who dropped out of the race (data not shown).

## Modeling the Stability of Trump Support with a Latent Markov Model (LMM)

While the riverplot demonstrates the nearly monotonic increase in aggregate Trump support, the lack of systematic gains from a particular candidate, and the absence of total retention at the individual level, it does not identify the individual panelist's level of stability from month-to-month. For example, those moving away from the eventual winner may have been the same individuals returning to the candidate. To better characterize the movement and

short- and long-term.

**Figure 2.** Riverplot of Support for the Major Republican Candidates, by Month, 2015-2016




Source: The American Panel Survey

stability of support for Donald Trump during the Republican primary campaign, we estimate a latent, or hidden, Markov model from August through April.

Latent Markov models (LMM) are often used to identify longitudinal change of a categorical latent trait (Van de Pol and Langeheine 2002). The key assumptions underlying these models are that responses are independent and that the number of categorical latent states is finite (MacDonald and Zucchini 1997).[16] The models estimate a general homogenous Markov chain for each observation across the finite latent states. Additionally, they estimate latent transition probabilities across states that control for observed changes that may be the result of measurement error (Bartolucci, Farcomeni, and Pennoni 2010). It is thus possible to estimate the proportion of sample that remains in a given state, changes states, as well as "sticks" to a state once they have changed.

The latent processes estimated by the LMM indicate large stability across the two latent states of "pro-Trump" and "anti-Trump." We find that roughly 0.71 of the sample of Republican primary voters are expected to remain in the same category from the beginning of the pre-primary season through the end of April. Of these unmoved movers, the vast majority, and the majority of the sample (0.55), were estimated to fall into the "never Trump" category (at least for the primary season). Only 0.16 of the Republican primary voters were estimated to be "only Trump" supporters; their latent process never deviated from the first latent classification. Nearly one-third (0.29) of Republican primary voters were estimated to change candidates at least once through April and many of those changing candidates landed with Trump.

We are able to identify the conditional transition probability of a given period for

[16]To meet these assumptions, we restrict the responses to primary candidate support to "pro-Trump" (1) and "anti-Trump" (2). In this way, we maintain independence of responses across time that may be violated due to losing candidates dropping out.

the panelists, given their previous state. Table 1 presents the estimates for these movements when accounting for measurement error. On the whole, we find great stability between the two states in any given wave. Roughly 0.95 of panelists are predicted to remain in the same latent class from wave to wave. Still, we do identify that movement towards Trump away from the "anti-Trump" state is predicted to be slightly more likely than movement away from Trump. Likewise, the results suggest that Trump supporters were slightly more likely to stick with the eventual nominee than in the "anti-Trump" state.

**Table 1.** Latent Markov Transition Probabilities

| | Anti-Trump$_t$ | Pro-Trump$_t$ |
|---|---|---|
| Anti-Trump$_{t-1}$ | 0.950 | 0.050 |
| Pro-Trump$_{t-1}$ | 0.037 | 0.963 |

While polls throughout the campaign demonstrated a near-permanence of Trump's support, we previously had little evidence to suggest that this phenomenon occurred at the individual-level. In fact, our data demonstrate that while Trump was able to siphon off marginal voters from other candidates from month to month, those primary voters in his camp remained very loyal. Likewise, those voters who were against Trump were nearly equal in their stability of opposition. Nonetheless, over the course of the primary campaign change in support for Donald Trump did occur. To identify this change, we employ a series of multivariate analyses.

## Multivariate Analysis

For the analysis of the primary months, we restrict our attention to panelists who reported that they participated in their home state's Republican primary or caucus. The dependent variables for each month are whether the panelist intended to vote for Trump in the primaries

if their state were to hold a primary or caucus on the day of the data collection.[17]

To test arguments about the composition of the Trump electorate, we estimate stacked longitudinal models and Cox proportional hazard models that exploit the multi-wave panel data. To estimate the effect of being in the white working class, we include a dichotomous indicator for race, where *white* is coded with a 1 and all other panelists are coded as 0. Income is operationalized using a five category variable based on CPS income quintiles.[18] The baseline *income quintile* is for those panelists with an annual income above $125,000. For education level, we employ a binary indicator where 1 corresponds to *college graduate* and 0 otherwise. *Party identification* is measured on a seven-point scale ranging from strong Democrat to strong Republican. We include a measure for the panelist's sex, coding *female* as 1 and 0 otherwise.

We also test attitudinal explanations for Trump's support. First, we derive a *populism* measure from the first factor of an exploratory factor analysis of fifteen items meant to capture panelists' feelings about the individual and his relationship to the government. Panelists were provided statements, giving their level of agreement on a five-point scale. Higher values indicate more populist outlooks. Second, we create a measure for *right wing authoritarianism (RWA)* by taking the first factor of a factor analysis for a five-item battery adopted from Altemeyer (1996). Once again, panelists provided their level of agreement to statements on a five-point scale. Higher values correspond to more authoritarian outlooks.[19] Third, we measure attitudes to three minority groups: blacks, Hispanics, and Muslims. Panelists

[17]We conducted a similar analysis with those panelists reporting to have voted for one of the two major party candidates in the general election. These findings and their discussion may be found in the Appendix.

[18]1= Less than $20,000, 2=Between $20,000 and $50,000, 3=Between $50,000 and $80,000, 4=Between $80,000 and $125,000, 5=More than $125,000

[19]Question wordings for the populism and RWA scale may be found in the Appendix.

provided thermometer ratings on a 10-point scale for fourteen different social groups. *Black affect*, *Hispanic affect*, and *Muslim affect* were measured by taking the difference between the thermometer ratings for blacks, Hispanics, and Muslims and the panelist's average rating for all other groups. Higher values correspond to warmer feelings towards blacks, Hispanics, and Muslims. Fourth, we scaled responses to ten policy preference questions to create a measure of *Liberalism*. Higher values indicate more frequent liberal responses. Survey items are described in the Appendix.[20] Finally, we consider the strength of Republican partisanship (strong Republican to strong Democrat) on the traditional party identification measure.

For the primary model of support for Trump, we regress support for the eventual winner on attitudinal variables (liberalism, authoritarianism, populism, Black affect, Hispanic affect, and Muslim affect) and demographic identities (income, gender, party identification, race, and college education) using a logit link function. We "stack" the observations across the eight waves, employing fixed effects for wave and clustering the standard errors by panelist.

The Cox proportional hazards model is commonly used in survival analysis to assess the relationship that exists between the time that passes before a certain event occurs and risk factors or exposures. The measure of effect is the "hazard rate," in this case interpreted as the probability of supporting Trump six points in time: September, October and November of 2015, and January, February and March of 2016. The covariates that we include as potential predictors of support are the demographic characteristics just described. Further, we also include time-varying covariates: opinions on whether Trump was qualified or not qualified to become president, and perceptions of whether Trump could win the Republican nomination. Our main effect of interest is the effect of these covariates on the decision of

[20]Descriptive statistics for our data are also included in Table 7 in the Appendix.

respondents to support Trump given that they have supported other candidates (or none) up to that point.[21]

# Findings

## Primary Season

Table 2 provides the estimated coefficients predicting Trump support in the primary season from the stacked longitudinal models. Within column I, we find some, but not overwhelming, evidence of a class effect during this earlier part of the campaign. To be sure, among Republican primary participants, it appears that Trump's support was not strongly related to those incomes towards the lower end of the distribution; relative to the highest quintile, all estimated coefficients in this simplified model are negative. This finding suggests that, all else equal, lower incomes were not more likely to support Trump compared to the wealthiest Republicans. Still, we do find strong support of an educational association with Trump support. Those Republican primary voters with a college degree were significantly less likely to support the eventual nominee than less well educated Republicans.[22] This effect is strong, but it is also most likely closely associated with attitudinal variables. Column III indicates that the inclusion of controls for attitudes reduces both the magnitude and precision of

[21] A change in candidate preference is reversible and so violates an assumption of hazards models. In our case, very few pro-Trump changes are followed by an anti-Trump change. Estimating our Cox model by excluding panelists with both pro- and anti-Trump changes does not change our interpretations.

[22] Cross-tabulations of Trump support by college education indicate a relatively consistent gap across attainment level. In August, Trump captured roughly 26% of the non-college educated support, while only taking 17% of the college-educated. By April, both figures had increased, but the difference was roughly similar. Trump received 44% of non-college graduates, while owning 31% of college graduate support.

education's effect (while keeping the negative direction).

With respect to attitudinal differences within the Republican primary electorate with respect to Trump, we identify two key predictors. First, those voters who were classified as having very strong feelings of populism were significantly more likely to support Trump than others. In April, for example, the average Trump voter scored 0.30 on the populism scale while the the average Cruz voter scored 0.09 and the average Kasich voter scored $-0.03$. While the difference between the latter two candidates was not statistically distinguishable, that between Trump and the others was statistically reliable at the 95% level.

We also find support for the argument that Trump had significant support from Republican primary voters who held less positive feelings towards minorities. Although we find little support to suggest more negative feelings towards blacks was associated with support for Trump, we find marginal evidence that those Republicans who held negative feelings against Hispanics were more likely to support the Republican nominee. Furthermore, we find particularly strong evidence that those primary voters with more negative feelings towards Muslims were more likely to identify as a Trump supporter. All else equal, rating this religious minority lower than the average group rating was associated with a significant increase in the probability of voting for Trump. This effect held when including demographic characteristics, as seen in column III.

In addition to estimating pooled cross-sectional relationships, we are able to leverage our panel data to determine if the effects of certain covariates change over the course of the primary campaign. Table 3 presents the interaction effects of party identification and affect towards Muslims with the monthly fixed effects. With respect to party identification, we find that relative to August, identification as a strong Republican is less likely to be associated with a Trump supporter in almost any other month. This finding is consistent with popular narratives regarding Trump's support. Trump's initial base of support was

**Table 2.** Predicting Trump Support among Republican Primary Voters

| | *Dependent variable: Primary Support for Trump* | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | I | II | III | IV | V |
| 1st Income Quintile | −0.134 | | −0.029 | −0.027 | −0.027 |
| | (0.288) | | (0.403) | (0.404) | (0.404) |
| 2nd Income Quintile | −0.066 | | 0.048 | 0.051 | 0.049 |
| | (0.267) | | (0.355) | (0.357) | (0.357) |
| 3rd Income Quintile | −0.055 | | 0.140 | 0.142 | 0.143 |
| | (0.250) | | (0.323) | (0.324) | (0.325) |
| 4th Income Quintile | −0.446 | | −0.790* | −0.791* | −0.791* |
| | (0.428) | | (0.321) | (0.322) | (0.323) |
| College Graduate | −0.564* | | −0.299 | −0.300 | −0.300 |
| | (0.154) | | (0.201) | (0.202) | (0.202) |
| 7-Point PID | −0.056 | | 0.030 | 0.206** | −0.030 |
| | (0.049) | | (0.075) | (0.098) | (0.075) |
| Female | −0.269 | | −0.137 | −0.138 | −0.138 |
| | (0.287) | | (0.202) | (0.203) | (0.203) |
| Liberalism | | −0.037 | −0.112 | −0.112 | −0.111 |
| | | (0.114) | (0.129) | (0.129) | (0.129) |
| Populism | | 0.974* | 1.231* | 1.234* | 1.236* |
| | | (0.194) | (0.205) | (0.206) | (0.206) |
| RWA | | −0.036 | −0.141 | −0.143 | −0.141 |
| | | (0.128) | (0.149) | (0.149) | (0.149) |
| Black Affect | | −0.049 | −0.028 | −0.028 | −0.030 |
| | | (0.047) | (0.049) | (0.049) | (0.049) |
| Hispanic Affect | | −0.068 | −0.098 | −0.099 | −0.098 |
| | | (0.052) | (0.058) | (0.058) | (0.058) |
| Muslim Affect | | −0.144* | −0.135* | −0.136* | −0.014 |
| | | (0.052) | (0.053) | (0.053) | (0.074) |
| Constant | −0.477 | −1.829* | −1.421* | −0.470 | −1.214* |
| | (0.381) | (0.137) | (0.542) | (0.620) | (0.540) |
| Observations | 4676 | 3248 | 3001 | 3001 | 3001 |
| Clusters | 642 | 410 | 379 | 379 | 379 |
| Log Likelihood | −2755.79 | −1799.47 | −1612.72 | −1609.19 | −1607.81 |
| FE | x | x | x | x | x |
| Interaction | | | | x | x |

*Note:* RWA denotes right wing authoritarianism *p<0.05

more strongly drawn from independents and Republican leaners rather than from traditional strong Republicans. Over the primary season, more strong Republicans came to support Trump and this difference dissipates.

Similarly, the interactions in Table 3 present time-varying effects with respect to attitudes towards Muslims. In the earlier months of the primary season, the effect of Muslim affect was predicted to be not significantly different from the initial month among Republican primary participants. By December, however, the discriminating effect based upon attitudes significantly increases in negative magnitude. That is, the relationship between negative feelings towards Muslims and Trump supporters grew stronger over the pre-primary months.

**Table 3.** Interaction Effects

| | *Interaction Effects* | |
|---|---|---|
| | Party ID | Muslim Affect |
| Base Coefficient | $-0.206^{*}$ | $-0.014$ |
| | (0.098) | (0.074) |
| September | $0.243^{*}$ | $-0.052$ |
| | (0.083) | (0.062) |
| October | $0.171^{*}$ | $-0.109$ |
| | (0.080) | (0.061) |
| November | $0.185^{**}$ | $-0.066$ |
| | (0.085) | (0.064) |
| December | 0.096 | $-0.131$ |
| | (0.088) | (0.068) |
| February | $0.241^{*}$ | $-0.158^{*}$ |
| | (0.095) | (0.070) |
| March | $0.226^{*}$ | $-0.235^{*}$ |
| | (0.105) | (0.073) |
| April | $0.215^{*}$ | $-0.179^{*}$ |
| | (0.103) | (0.076) |
| *Note:* | | $^{*}$p<0.05 |

To better understand the dynamism of these effects, consider Figure 3. In Figure 3a, we see that Independents are predicted to support Trump with roughly 0.25 probability, while strong Republicans are predicted to do so with about 0.15 probability. By the end of

the primary campaign, however, this predicted probability among Republican identifiers has essentially converged near 0.40. Such a finding suggests that by the end of the campaign Donald Trump had a relatively diverse constituency with respect to partisan identification in the Republican primary electorate. The opposite trend in effects may be found in Figure 3b. In the earliest days of the primary, attitudes towards Muslims did not stand out as a strong predictor of support for Donald Trump. We find that the predicted probability across the most positive and most negative primary voters was about 0.20. Yet, by the end of the primary, those Republicans with the most negative attitudes were predicted to support Trump with a probability of roughly 0.45, while those with the most positive were predicted to so at approximately 0.25 probability. While we cannot make a causal argument regarding an inflection point, we do find the discriminating nature of this variable increases shortly after Donald Trump called for a "total and complete shutdown" of Muslims entering the United States in late November 2015.

Finally, we are also interested in seeing what drove Republican primary voters to join or resist the Trump coalition from each of our data points. More specifically, we are interested in assessing what type of respondent was more likely to start supporting Trump throughout the campaign. To further explore this question, we implement a Cox proportional hazards model. This type of model is widely used in biomedical applications to model the expected time of the occurrence of a particular event that in this case we define as "support for Trump". The multiple answers through time for each panelist in TAPS allow us to observe the specific point in which Trump supporters declare for the first time their intention to vote for him in the primary election. It is worth highlighting that this type of model assumes that once a subject experiences the event under analysis (e.g. reports support for Trump), she does not change that status and in our analysis remains as a Trump supporter. While this is a strong assumption that is violated in the current study given changes in respondents'

**Figure 3.** Predicted Probability of Supporting Trump: PID and Muslim Affect Interacted with Wave




**(a)** Support by PID




**(b)** Support by Muslim Affect

answers, analyses of stability and change suggest a remarkable level of stability of the Trump coalition that decreases the concerns for this issue. Results from a Latent Markov Chain model indicate that the transition probability of staying in the Anti-Trump coalition from time $t-1$ to time $t$ is 0.950, and 0.963 for the Pro-Trump coalition.

The results of the Cox proportional hazards model (Table 4) demonstrate key attitudes are related to joining or resisting Trump. First, populism is a significant predictor of support for Trump throughout the campaign. However, we can observe that the effect of most of the demographics included in the model is not distinguishable from zero at conventional levels. Furthermore, we also included two time-varying variables to assess their effect on the propensity to start supporting Trump: whether respondents consider Trump to be qualified to be president, and whether they consider Trump could win the election. The results indicate that both of these perceptions are positively associated with the propensity to support him. Figure 4 illustrates these findings. The $x$-axis shows the different points in time, and the $y-$axis the probability of *not* supporting Trump. In panel a, the two curves depict the different behaviors and risk patterns between people that considered that Trump could win and those that did not think he could win. Panel b shows the same propensity but among groups that considered he was qualified or not qualified to be president. To validate the results from this analysis, we conduct tests for proportionality that were successfully passed.[23]

[23]Another potential concern of this analysis is the violation of the assumption that all subjects in the sample will eventually experience the event of interest, even if it happens after the end of a study. In biomedical studies where survival rates are the quantity of interest, the assumption that individuals will eventually die is indeed fulfilled. Even though the assumption that all TAPS panelists will eventually support Trump is unrealistic, the Republican sample used for this analysis and the subsequent support for Trump of the majority of self-reported Republicans once he was a candidate in the general election helps to ameliorate the effects of the violation of this assumption.

**Table 4.** Survival analysis: factors associate with Trump support

| | *Dependent variable:* |
|---|---|
| | Intention to vote for Trump |
| Female | −0.201 |
| | (0.161) |
| 1st Income Quintile | −0.165 |
| | (0.290) |
| 2nd Income Quintile | 0.055 |
| | (0.261) |
| 3rd Income Quintile | −0.026 |
| | (0.975) |
| 4th Income Quintile | −0.425 |
| | (0.262) |
| College | −0.186 |
| | (0.160) |
| Liberalism | 0.228* |
| | (0.104) |
| Authoritarianism | 0.129 |
| | (0.124) |
| Populism | 0.709* |
| | (0.492) |
| Black affect | 0.005 |
| | (0.046) |
| Hispanic affect | −0.069 |
| | (0.049) |
| Muslim affect | −0.091* |
| | (0.039) |
| "He could win" | 1.558* |
| | (0.355) |
| "He is qualified" | 1.486* |
| | (0.209) |
| Other controls | Yes |
| Observations | 1,536 |
| LR Test | 218.9* (df = 14) |

*** $p < 0.05$

**Figure 4.** Probability of NOT supporting Trump (September 2015-March 2016) by attitudes towards him




**(a)** Perceptions of success: "He could win"




**(b)** Perceptions of qualifications: "He is qualified"

## Did Trump Support Differ from Other Republican Candidates?

Populism, ethnic biases, and class have been found to predict Trump support among the Republican electorate, but it is unclear if these statistical relationships identify Trump as a unique Republican candidate. Traditional indicators of support, such as party identification and operational liberalism, were found to have little effect on the outcome variable in pooled models. It may be that these dimensions within the Republican electorate are meaningless and the determinants of support for Trump are also the determinants for other major candidates.

To explore if the driving forces of Trump's support are unique from other Republican candidates, we ran models similar to those in Table 2, column III for Trump's final two challengers: Ted Cruz and John Kasich. The results of these models may be found in Table 5. If Trump support is no different than that of other candidates, we should expect to see the estimated effects for populism, ethnic biases, and college education status as significant, but in the opposite direction of the Trump model (that is, the effects should be negative, positive, and positive, respectively).

We do find that populism has a strong effect on the likelihood of supporting one of the other major candidates during the primary season. This predicted effect is significant and in the expected negative direction. That is, those panelists who identified less as populists were more likely to support either Cruz or Kasich, in distinct contrasts to those high populists primary voters who were more likely to support Trump.

At the same time, however, we find evidence that Trump's determinants of support are unique from those of Cruz and Kasich. First, columns I and II indicate that college

degrees serve as particularly poor predictors of support for Cruz and Kasich. While it is the case that they are positive, these effects are not statistically district from zero. Furthermore, attitudes towards Muslims, while displaying a positive effect, are also not distinct from zero. This result suggests that religious biases played little role in determining whether a primary participant voiced support for Kasich and Cruz. Finally, we find that operational liberalism played a significant role in support for these two runners-up. As the results indicate, Cruz performed significantly better with strong conservatives, while Kasich won the support of (relative) ideological moderates. Trump, on the other hand, appeared to pull from no distinct portion of the ideological spectrum in the Republican party.

These contrasts in predictions suggest that in some ways, Trump was not operating in a different realm of other Republican party candidates. He catered to those with high levels of populism, where other candidates won the support of those who were less populistic. At the same time, Trump appears to have not won systematic support on the traditional ideological spectrum in the Republican party. Cruz and Kasich were counting on unique ideological groups, but liberalism did not play as influential a role in Trump's ascendance.

# Conclusion

Why did Donald Trump win the Republican primary nomination? Pundits and scholars thought his candidacy was unlikely to be successful. He deviated from the standard Republican message. His public speeches would typically have been considered gaffes. He was unable to garner support from the Republican National Party or the standard political elites. Pundit expectations, as well as scholarly ones, were that this candidate was not one to be taken seriously. Yet, a careful look at the empirical data during the primary campaign would suggest that Trump's candidacy followed standard patterns. This paper, then, establishes

**Table 5.** Predicting Alternative Candidate Support among Republican Primary Voters

| | *Dependent variable: Support for ...* | |
|---|---|---|
| | Cruz | Kasich |
| 1st Income Quintile | 0.816 | $-1.756^{*}$ |
| | (0.451) | (0.545) |
| 2nd Income Quintile | 0.436 | $-0.643$ |
| | (0.435) | (0.406) |
| 3rd Income Quintile | 0.234 | $-0.385$ |
| | (0.403) | (0.382) |
| 4th Income Quintile | 0.542 | $-0.157$ |
| | (0.386) | (0.355) |
| College Graduate | 0.097 | 0.033 |
| | (0.236) | (0.277) |
| 7-Point PID | $-0.015$ | 0.123 |
| | (0.093) | (0.079) |
| Female | 0.042 | $-0.356$ |
| | (0.237) | (0.279) |
| Liberalism | $-1.306^{*}$ | $0.615^{*}$ |
| | (0.196) | (0.184) |
| Populism | $-0.569^{*}$ | $-0.491^{*}$ |
| | (0.165) | (0.171) |
| RWA | 0.003 | $-0.320$ |
| | (0.172) | (0.195) |
| Black Affect | 0.059 | $-0.016$ |
| | (0.064) | (0.086) |
| Hispanic Affect | 0.111 | 0.044 |
| | (0.066) | (0.092) |
| Muslim Affect | 0.018 | 0.009 |
| | (0.057) | (0.59) |
| Constant | $-4.420^{*}$ | $-2.739^{*}$ |
| | (0.635) | (0.580) |
| Observations | 3006 | 3006 |
| Clusters | 379 | 379 |
| Log Likelihood | $-1054.99$ | $-726.91$ |
| FE | x | x |

*Note:* RWA denotes right wing authoritarianism

$^{*}$p<0.05

the instances where Trump's candidacy was surprising through careful examination of survey data. This project, then, relies upon evidence, instead of anecdotes, to understand Trump's success.

The surprising candidacy of Donald Trump elicited many questions from the political press, as well as political science researchers. One of the most salient of these questions concerned the composition of his support and whether they differed from traditional Republican electorates. In this study we have exploited an original data set to characterize the foundation of Trump's support. Our findings suggest that support may be characterized differently over the course of the pre-primary and primary season. We hypothesized that factors such as working class, personality, race, populism and Trump's domination of the media were key driving factors in establishing Trump's lead in the Republican primary campaign. Using a monthly panel dataset of Americans, we are able to establish the contributions of these factors into public support for Trump.

Among Republican primary voters, Trump's earliest support was strongly correlated with panelists who exhibited high levels of populism and low levels of Muslim affect. We also found marginal evidence that his earliest primary supporters were less strongly identified with the Republican party. At the primary voter level, our modeling of patterns of support using a latent Markov chain suggests that Trump's supporters were particularly stable in their preference. By the end of the primaries, this relationship to party identification dissipated, while affect towards Muslims increased in its association with Trump support. A proportional hazard model confirmed the importance of populism for switching to Trump, while beliefs regarding his qualifications and ability to win in November also influenced the outcome variable.

While education, populism, and anti-Muslim bias, and, to a lesser degree, anti-Hispanic bias, promoted support for Trump during the primary season, authoritarianism, as

usually measured, did not. Consistent with the findings of Rahn and Oliver for mid-March 2016, Trump supporters were somewhat authoritarian but that did not distinguish them from other Republicans on average. Populism, rooted in concerns that the system is stacked against the "little guy," was far more important. We also find that Trump was unique in that the determinants of his support were more distinct from the traditional left-right dimension than other Republican primary candidates.

To a large extent, the candidacy of Donald Trump appeals to standard characteristics known to play key roles in American politics. He was a frontrunner throughout the primary campaign. That populism and racism were dominant themes that increased his support is not surprising, but to a great extent perhaps the failure of the Republican establishment to embrace Trump's narrative suggests an alternative perspective for the future of the Republican Party.

Understanding the role that voters play in selecting presidential candidates builds our understanding of the basic functions of representative democracy. In the Trump election, Republican primary voters maintained a dominant voice in choosing their candidate. When we consider changes in the way in which Americans select their presidential candidates – remembering that between 1924 and 1968 state and national party elites controlled the selection – it is somewhat remarkable what a limited role party elites were able to maintain in this contest. Nomination rules and procedures are not fixed by law. Whether these will change as a consequence of the Trump election will be part of a national dialogue for years to come.

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# Appendix

## Populism

Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

1. The politicians in Congress need to follow the will of the people.
2. Judges frequently hinder the work of presidents, and they should be ignored.
3. The government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves.
4. Our presidents should have the necessary power so that they can act in favor of the national interest.
5. The people, and not the politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.
6. Our presidents should do what the people want even when the laws prohibit him from doing it.
7. Elected politicians sell out to big business.
8. What our country needs is a strong, determined president who will crush evil and set us on the right path again.
9. Big corporations accumulate wealth by exploiting the people.
10. Politicians are actually interested in what people like me think.
11. Our politics is hostage to the interests of a military-industrial complex.
12. Our presidents should obey the laws even when the people don't like it.
13. Politicians should follow rather than lead the people.
14. Our political system has been corrupted.
15. I prefer politicians who I feel like I could get to know as a person.

## Right Wing Authoritarianism

Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

1. There is no one right way to live life; everybody has to create their own way.
2. Our country needs free thinkers who will have the courage to defy traditional ways, even if this upsets many people.
3. The old-fashioned ways and old-fashioned values still show the best way to live.
4. Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the 'rotten apples' who are ruining everything.
5. What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil and take us back to our true path.

## Liberalism

Do you generally support or oppose

1. increasing taxes on wealth individuals
2. federal Common Core standards for schools
3. allowing illegal immigrants to eventually be eligible for U.S. citizenship
4. gun control legislation
5. same-sex marriage
6. a woman's right to an abortion
7. building the Keystone XL oil pipeline
8. repealing the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare)
9. federal regulation of greenhouse gas emissions
10. using U.S. ground troops to fight ISIS in Iraq and Syria

## General Election

When we move from the primary season to the general election, Trump's support among Republicans blossoms and populism fades as a distinctive feature of the Trump coalition. To estimate support during the general election, we limit our analysis to one wave of data: November 2016. We estimate the probability of voting for Donald Trump using a logit link function. To test the hypothesis regarding the relationship between the white working class and support for Donald Trump, we also subset our data by white respondents, attempting to identify effects regarding income quintile and educational status on the probability of voting for Trump. Table 6 presents these results. First, while the strength of party identification and operational ideology were both inconsistent predictors of support in the primary, unsurprisingly, they prove to be influential covariates for all (two-party) voters in November. To be sure, of those voting for one of the two major party candidates, 88 percent of Democrats voted for Clinton and 92 percent of Republicans in the sample voted for Trump. Policy preferences also strongly predict candidate preference. More liberal panelists were less likely to vote for the current president. Finally, we also find that gender was a significant predictor of vote choice in the general election, while it was not so among Republican primary voters. Women were significantly more likely to support Clinton than they were to vote for Trump.

Populism was associated with Trump support among Republicans during the primary season, but it lacks the effect in November. Rather, right wing authoritarianism is a stronger predictor of vote choice in November, even controlling for party and ideology. We also find that racial attitudes are weaker predictors within the general election. Muslim affect is a strong predictor in the primary model, but when controlling for party identification, liberalism, and authoritarianism among the general electorate, we find this effect dissipates. Hence, it is difficult to argue that racial attitudes had an effect independent of party and

ideology on Trump support in the general election. Still we do find marginal support that negative attitudes towards blacks are associated with support for Trump in the general election.

Finally, we further investigate the dynamics of class and Trump support in the November election. In the first column of Table 6, we find that lower income quintiles were significantly more likely to support Donald Trump in the general election than those panelists who were located in the wealthiest category. Furthermore, we find strong evidence that education is strongly related to Trump support. Those panelists with a college degree were significantly more likely to vote for Clinton than the Republican, all else equal. Finally, we find strong evidence that white voters, while controlling for a series of other covariates were significantly more likely to vote for Trump. Each of these findings would appear to be consistent with the argument that Trump drew heavy support from the white working class.

We also subset our data with just white panelists who reported voting for one of the two major party candidates. The models predict mostly the same effects. Among whites, party identification exerts a strong, positive influence on vote choice. Similarly, more conservative policy preferences are highly predictive of voting for Trump over Clinton. Right wing authoritarianism also maintains its strong relationship with the outcome variable.

## Supplementary Tables

**Table 6.** Predicting Trump Support among General Election Voters

| | *Dependent variable: General Election, All* | | | *Dependent variable: General Election, White* | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | I | II | III | IV | V | VI |
| 1st Income Quintile | 1.675* | | 1.539 | 0.324 | | −1.182 |
| | (0.644) | | (0.843) | (0.455) | | (0.862) |
| 2nd Income Quintile | 1.824* | | 0.889 | 0.706 | | −1.125 |
| | (0.689) | | (0.848) | (0.424) | | (0.739) |
| 3rd Income Quintile | 0.788 | | −0.483 | 0.570 | | −0.702 |
| | (0.589) | | (0.890) | (0.401) | | (0.696) |
| 4th Income Quintile | 0.838 | | 0.844 | 0.139 | | −0.920 |
| | (0.543) | | (0.669) | (0.441) | | (0.703) |
| College Graduate | −0.670* | | −0.401 | −0.775* | | −0.514 |
| | (0.333) | | (0.529) | (0.258) | | (0.439) |
| 7-Point PID | 0.896* | | 0.705* | 0.853* | | 0.477* |
| | (0.089) | | (0.142) | (0.078) | | (0.124) |
| Female | −0.231 | | −0.931 | −0.060 | | 0.323 |
| | (0.316) | | (0.491) | (0.255) | | (0.432) |
| White | 1.128* | | 1.387* | | | |
| | (0.316) | | (0.545) | | | |
| Liberalism | | −2.248* | −2.155* | | −2.665* | −2.361 |
| | | (0.326) | (0.370) | | (0.282) | (0.312) |
| Populism | | 0.041 | 0.028 | | 0.608* | 0.562* |
| | | (0.181) | (0.178) | | (0.266) | (0.283) |
| RWA | | 0.921* | 1.128* | | 0.788* | 0.834* |
| | | (0.312) | (0.354) | | (0.284) | (0.344) |
| Black Affect | | −0.234* | −0.147 | | 0.199 | 0.141 |
| | | (0.107) | (0.117) | | (0.133) | (0.184) |
| Hispanic Affect | | −0.048 | −0.019 | | −0.190 | −0.203 |
| | | (0.161) | (0.106) | | (0.162) | (0.218) |
| Muslim Affect | | −0.159 | −0.062 | | −0.233* | −0.231 |
| | | (0.152) | (0.125) | | (0.114) | (0.127) |
| Constant | −0.477 | −2.664* | −3.410* | −3.206* | −0.067 | −0.969 |
| | (0.381) | (0.520) | (1.088) | (0.479) | (0.236) | (0.823) |
| Observations | 1109 | 835 | 783 | 887 | 664 | 630 |
| Log Likelihood | −392.85 | −202.38 | −168.78 | −332.18 | −135.91 | −112.67 |

*Note:* RWA denotes right wing authoritarianism

*p<0.05

**Table 7.** Republican Primary Electorate Means

| | All Voters | April Trump | April Cruz | April Kasich |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1st Income Quintile | 0.144 | 0.147 | 0.160 | 0.100 |
| 2nd Income Quintile | 0.202 | 0.237 | 0.201 | 0.146 |
| 3rd Income Quintile | 0.272 | 0.268 | 0.278 | 0.215 |
| 4th Income Quintile | 0.238 | 0.219 | 0.225 | 0.292 |
| 5th Income Quintile | 0.144 | 0.130 | 0.136 | 0.246 |
| White | 0.904 | 0.900 | 0.899 | 0.942 |
| Female | 0.435 | 0.386 | 0.438 | 0.403 |
| College Graduate | 0.501 | 0.415 | 0.489 | 0.701 |
| 7-Point PID | 5.671 | 5.604 | 5.938 | 5.514 |
| Liberalism | −0.816 | −0.892 | −1.130 | 0.426 |
| Populism | 0.185 | 0.407 | 0.062 | −0.035 |
| RWA | 0.467 | 0.516 | 0.626 | 0.212 |
| Black Affect (-9 to 9) | 1.210 | 0.927 | 1.444 | 1.262 |
| Hispanic Affect (-9 to 9) | 1.209 | 1.089 | 1.423 | 1.240 |
| Muslim Affect (-9 to 9) | −1.565 | −1.997 | −1.602 | −1.266 |
| Observations | 685 | 236 | 176 | 144 |