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Pathways to Trump:
Republican Voters in 2016

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Abstract

The 2016 candidacy of Donald Trump has drawn considerable interest among social scientists. Long-standing interests in the role of authoritarianism, populism, race, and class as determinants of political preferences and behavior have resurfaced. In this paper, we rely upon a unique survey panel to explore changing support for Republican presidential candidates over the primary season, test competing theories regarding the attitudinal shifts that propelled the Trump candidacy forward, and evaluate the influence of perceptions of success that respondents held about Trump and the decision to support him during the primaries. We find that populist attitudes were considerably more important than authoritarian dispositions in explaining support for Trump among Republicans during the 2016 primary season.

Word Count: 7,475

Introduction

The candidacy of Donald Trump for the Republican nomination for president began in June 2015 with an announcement from Trump Tower in New York. His candidacy was distinctive, if not entirely unique, in several ways. Trump had not run for public office before, he promised to self-fund his campaign, and he had declared himself a candidate for the Reform Party's presidential nomination in 1999, announced that he was a Democrat in 2004, and affiliated with the Republicans for the first time in 2009. He toyed with the idea of running for the 2012 Republican nomination but dropped the effort in mid-2011. In his 2015 announcement, he emphasized the themes of offshoring jobs and trade deals that ran counter to longstanding Republican orthodoxy, but he also highlighted the issues of immigration, national debt, and Islamic terrorism. His promise to build a wall across the border with Mexico originated in that speech.

The electoral coalition that emerged to support Donald Trump's presidential candidacy surprised many observers of American politics. He was considered too unprepared for a presidential campaign and the presidency, out of the mainstream of Republican opinion on key issues, and too unconventional in style and rhetoric to fit his party. Yet, he won in a manner similar to other successful Republican nominees. He started the primary season as a frontrunner and then, with a few stumbles, expanded his base of support within the party, acquired double the number of delegates of his closest competitor by mid-March, and then steadily added the delegates required to win the nomination.

In this paper, we evaluate the fit of two important themes in the study of American political behavior—authoritarianism and populism—to support for Trump's candidacy. During the 2015-2016 campaign cycle, both social scientists and informed commentators drew the connection between these themes and Trump's appeal. These themes also were

joined with other narratives—one about the economic interests of the working class and one about race—that emphasized Trump’s appeal to working class whites. We consider how these claims about Trump supporters—their authoritarian, populist, racist, and class traits—shaped Trump’s electoral coalition.

Trump’s electoral coalition evolved over the 18-month electoral cycle. Trump announced his candidacy in June 2015, led among Republican candidates throughout the fall of 2015, and expanded his support through the primary season between February and May, when he was deemed the presumptive winner for the nomination. Popular commentary emphasizes that working class whites were a critical and early component of Trump’s support, but the gradual and incomplete acquisition of support from other Republicans deserves examination. We consider who moved to Trump through the major stages of the nomination process, test conceptions of the factors that drew Republican voters to Trump, and observe how electoral momentum and the winnowing of candidates fed supporters to Trump and his major competitors.

The Trump Candidacy and Theories of Latent Attitudes

The Trump candidacy generated two overlapping theoretical accounts of his early popularity. The first to emerge is the authoritarian account, which received considerable attention from popular commentators. The second emphasis was the emergence of populism, or sometimes right-wing populism. These are related but distinct accounts of Trump’s early support. We begin by providing an introduction to studies of authoritarianism and populism, contrast the two accounts, and briefly review how the two accounts infiltrated popular discourse about Trump’s candidacy.

Authoritarianism and Populism

While *authoritarianism* has been studied since the mid-20th century, Stenner's *The Authoritarian Dynamic* (2005) brought latent authoritarian tendencies in modern America back to the surface of social science. For Stenner, an authoritarian is a person "who cannot treat with natural ease or generosity those who are not his own kindred or kind, who is inclined to believe only 'right-thinking' people should be free to air their opinions, and who tends to see others' moral choices as everybody's business indeed, the business of the state" (Stenner 2005, 1). These tendencies may be so "deep-seated" that "neither they nor we have much capacity to alter." Authoritarians place a high value on social order so their authoritarianism is most likely to guide their political preferences when primed by elites who emphasize threats to the old order, the threats of outsiders, and challengers to important social values.

Stenner's work emerged from a line of argument made by Feldman and Stenner (1997) and Hetherington and Weiler (2009), in which authoritarianism is treated as a personality profile rather than a political preference or party affiliation. Hetherington and Suhay (2011) show that more authoritarian attitudes can emerge from Americans who did not previously show strong authoritarian dispositions when they perceive a threat for terrorism. "Authoritarian thinking" might emerge even for people without authoritarian personalities. However, weaker stimuli, such as a gradual change in social norms, do not generate authoritarian thinking.

Weiler and Hetherington (2006) have taken the argument a step farther by popularizing the view that authoritarianism underlies the partisan polarization of recent decades. They assert that "authoritarianism is central both to understanding the nature of the contemporary political divide and why Republican issue appeals, which have been increasingly organized around authoritarian-inspired issues, have been so effective." They observe that

authoritarians are disproportionately white, less-well educated, and religious. Trump, to draw a reasonable inference from this perspective, primed a not-so-latent authoritarianism more effectively than other Republican candidates.

In contrast to authoritarianism, which political scientists now treat as a personality trait, *populism* is label attached to a set of political attitudes associated with some political movements and parties (Jansen 2011; Nicholson and Segura 2012). A common theme in populist movements is that ordinary citizens are exploited by a privileged, corrupt elite—the “little guy” against big government and big business. It is most famously associated with farmer movements against railroads and Eastern manufacturing interests in the late 19th and early 20th century. At times, both major parties have been splintered by populist factions and, in the aftermath of the Great Recession, both parties have again shown a kind of factionalism stimulated by the candidacies of Trump and, for the Democrats, of Bernie Sanders.

Trump’s emphasis on “draining the swamp,” the biases of the major media, and the us-against-them battle are shared with older populist traditions. Because Democrats have benefited from an advantage over Republicans in being viewed in populist terms (Nicholson and Segura 2012), Trump’s emergence as a leading Republican candidate with populist themes made his candidacy distinctive and created the possibility of significant change in the electoral coalitions of the two parties. This development raises the question about the contribution of populist attitudes to motivating support for Trump during the primary season.

On the surface, authoritarianism and populism appear to share some general themes. A perception of threat, deep faults in the social order, and even hidden conspiracies appear to be common features of both sets of attitudes. Indeed, social scientists have recognized these common threads for some time (Holbo 1961; Tucker 1956; Oliver and Wood 2014). Although

the outsider threat of authoritarian thinking is distinct from the elite threat of populism, there is nothing to prevent someone from perceiving both types of threats. In fact, it is easy to see how political rhetoric can readily address both themes. Trump emphasized both the role of trade agreements and immigration as threats to jobs, and the benefits of trade agreements and shipping jobs abroad to domestic elites. Claims about threats to the social order and deep biases in that social order were readily combined.

Popular Accounts

Trump's support settled in the range of 25-30 percent among registered Republicans in the fall of 2015, which left a majority of Republicans supporting other candidates. As a non-traditional Republican, it was argued, Trump would eventually lose to another Republican (Bush, Rubio, Cruz, or Kasich) who would accumulate support from voters whose favorite candidates dropped out of the race. Instead, Trump's support among Republicans exhibited a 5-10 percent improvement in the first two months of 2016 and eventually climbed even higher in March. Trump became the presumptive winner, but not a consensus winner, in April he effectively clinched the nomination when Cruz lost the Indiana primary in early May.

Over the course of the pre-primary and primary season, commentators discovered the authoritarian and populist accounts and even scholars offered quick analysis of Trump's appeal and core constituency. The major claims were that Trump's core support came from working class whites with at least somewhat authoritarian, racist, and populist attitudes. These claims warrant brief discussion.

The dominant theme of most popular accounts of early Trump support was his support among working class whites, particularly among men. A syndrome of lost manufacturing jobs and downward mobility, pessimism about the future of their children, rising income in-

equality, and declining health and life expectancy made the Trump message appealing (e.g. Case and Deaton 2015).¹ Survey data during the primary and general election campaigns and the surge in turnout in certain counties appear to confirm this theme.² Working class whites from outside the usual Republican primary electorate gave Trump a wave of support and, because of their policy views and social values, created strategic problems for traditional Republican candidates. Elements of this narrative were age and education: Trump's appeal was strongest to middle aged Americans with less than a college education who filled the ranks of the working class. These themes were not new to social scientists (Teixeira and Rogers 2000, Zweig 2000), but they became central to popular commentary in 2015 and 2016.

The link of Trump's success to authoritarianism received considerable media attention.³ Extreme views—for example, support for banning Muslims—seemed to run high among

¹<http://www.prrri.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/PRRI-AVS-2015-Web.pdf>; <http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/archived-projects/economic-mobility-project>

²https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/white-working-class-men-increasingly-2016/10/05/95610130-8a51-11e6-875e-2c1bfe943b66_story.html?utm_term=.fb8ed79e1eal; <http://files.kff.org/attachment/Report-Kaiser-Family-Foundation-CNN-Working-Class-Whites-Poll>; <http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/20/politics/2016-election-white-working-class-voters/>; <http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21709596-support-donald-trump-working-class-whites-not-wh>; https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/28/upshot/a-2016-review-turnout-wasnt-the-driver-of-clinton.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=first-column-region®ion=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=1

³For more discussion of authoritarianism and Trump support, see http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-weiler/understanding-trump---its_b_11338384.html; <http://www.vox.com/2016/3/1/11127424/trump-authoritarianism>; <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/donald-trumps-authoritarian-politics-of-memory/>

Trump supporters. In one report, location on an authoritarianism scale had a significant discriminating effect among Republicans in their support for Trump.⁴ The authoritarian interpretation was contested in a popular political science blog by political scientists Rahn and Oliver, based on a survey conducted in mid-March 2016, but the dominant theme of media coverage seemed to reinforce the Weiler-Hetherington view that authoritarianism underlies modern political divisions.⁵

Other observers emphasized racism and noted Trump's appeal to ethnic and racial resentments among whites.⁶ In fact, the Clinton campaign openly referred to Trump's campaign of prejudice and paranoia, which probably was intended to cover Trump's views on undocumented immigrants, refugees, Muslims, Hispanics, and perhaps others, in addition to attitudes about African Americans.⁷ Trump's candidacy, in this account, exploited ethnic and racial sensitivities to develop his initial base of support.

Somewhat less prominently, observers emphasized Trump's populism. In this case, the emphasis was on a conservative brand of populism that some observers struggled to define. For some observers, it was connected to the right-wing populism of George Wallace,

514004/; <http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/10/the-gops-age-of-authoritarianism-has.html>

⁴<http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/01/donald-trump-2016-authoritarian-213533>.

⁵https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/09/trumps-voters-arent-authoritarians-new-research-says-so-what-are-they/?utm_term=.1e1678028796

⁶https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/11/22/peoples-views-about-race-mattered-more-in-electing-trump-than-in-electing-obama/?utm_term=.e6cbf54256ca

⁷<http://www.vox.com/2016/9/12/12882796/trump-supporters-racist-deplorables>

Pat Buchanan, and some leaders of the Christian right. The trade and immigration themes of the Trump platform pitted Trump against long-standing Republican policy positions and appealed to non-traditional Republicans.⁸ His populism has been questioned since his election, but during the primary campaign his populist themes clearly distinguished him from most of his Republican competitors.

Finally, we must observe that, while Trump had several potential sources of appeal to voters, he also generated a vocal opposition among Republicans. The main objects of criticism were Trump's issue position, rhetorical appeals, and his personal qualities, which implicated all four themes of interest here—authoritarianism, populism, racism, and class. Some Republican elites took extraordinary steps in an attempt to stop Trump—most notably, Mitt Romney's blistering speech condemning Trump on March 2—and others refused or were very slow to endorse him. There is a credible case that all four themes featured in early support for Trump, but left unaddressed is how the importance of these factors evolved as the Trump coalition grew during the primary season.

Plainly, the arguments about the working class, authoritarian personalities, populism, and ethnicity and race are not identifying mutually exclusive groups or processes. In fact, Inglehart and Norris (2016) tie the populism to a cultural backlash that is rooted in social values that is akin to the authoritarian and racial dimensions that others have emphasized. In this account, populism is one pole of a continuum and opposite to “cosmopolitan” values, which include multiculturalism, diversity, openness, and inclusiveness (Jackman and Vavreck 2011). Other interpretations emphasize “white populism” and similar concepts that refer to a backlash to social change, external threats, and challenges to white identity that make a combination of populist, authoritarian, and race-based themes appealing to many

⁸<http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/03/donald-trump-the-perfect-populist-21369>

Americans.⁹

The Challenge of Evaluating Explanations of Trump's Support Over Time

If these arguments about Trump's distinctive or core support account for his standing at the start of the primary season, they may not account for his success in expanding his base over the course of the primary season in the first half of 2016. In that period, his competitors dropped out of the race and their supporters gradually moved to Trump and the remaining candidates. On March 15, the day of the Florida, Illinois, North Carolina, Ohio, and other primaries, Trump won 228 delegates, giving him over half of the delegates needed to win the nomination and leaving only Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz, and John Kasich with any chance of overtaking him. Kasich was not in the picture as the primary season began, and Cruz showed steady growth in support as candidates dropped out.

By late March, Trump's standing in the polls had risen to the mid-40s. Little is known about the kind of support—about 20 percent of Republicans—that Trump attracted during the primary season between January and May. By May, when the last standing candidates with Cruz, Kasich, and Trump, a majority of Republicans supported one of the other candidates. Cruz was a very conservative, Tea Party-oriented candidate; Kasich was a more traditional conservative and stylishly moderate candidate. Republicans appeared to have winnowed the field to three distinctive alternatives. Thus, a complete view of Trump's early and late, core and peripheral, support requires data and methods to account for the evolution of his coalition over time.

⁹<https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/02/world/americas/brexit-donald-trump-whites.html>

Data and Methods

Our central concern is the evolving role of authoritarianism, populism, race and class, in shaping the composition of the Trump coalition during 2015 and 2016. We exploit The American Panel Survey (TAPS) to trace the candidate preferences of Republican primary and general election voters and test the fit of popular accounts of the Trump candidacy.¹⁰ Panel data allow us to determine whether the major elements of the Trump story (working class, authoritarianism, racism, populism) help to account for Trump's early support and explain willingness to shift to Trump during the primary and general election seasons. Both changes in cross-sectional correlates in Trump support and propensity to shift to Trump

¹⁰The survey was started in December of 2011 by Knowledge Networks (now GfK Knowledge Networks). The sampling frame used to select the 2,000 respondents is the U.S. Postal Service's computerized delivery sequence file (CDSF), which covers around 97% of the physical addresses in all fifty states including P.O. boxes and rural route addresses. This frame is appended with information regarding household residents' names, demographic characteristics of the inhabitants, and landline telephone numbers obtained from other sources such as the U.S. Census files and commercial data bases (such as white pages). The respondents are recruited based on a random stratified sample, where Hispanics and young adults between 18 and 24 years of age are slightly oversampled in order to account for their tendency to under-respond to surveys. Those individuals without internet access are provided with a computer and internet access. More technical information about the survey is available at <http://taps.wustl.edu>. Upon entering the panel, each panelist completes a profile survey comprised of key demographic indicators. At the beginning of each month, members of the panel receive a notification to complete the new survey. Each wave remains open for approximately one month and takes between 15 and 25 minutes to complete. Such breadth of data provides researchers with a unique opportunity to investigate trends and changes at the individual level. For example, if an individual remains active in the panel for two years, TAPS collects over 1,000 variables at 24 different points in time for one individual. Such design invites investigation of individual-level change over both the short- and long-term.

yield insights about the emergence of a winning coalition.

Modeling the Stability of Trump Support with a Latent Markov Model (LMM)

To characterize evolving support for Donald Trump during the Republican primary campaign, we estimate a latent Markov model from August through April. Latent Markov models (LMM) are often used to identify longitudinal change of a categorical latent trait (Van de Pol and Langeheine 2002). The key assumptions underlying these models are that responses are independent and that the number of categorical latent states is finite (MacDonald and Zucchini 1997).¹¹ The models estimate a general homogenous Markov chain for each observation across the finite latent states. Additionally, they estimate latent transition probabilities across states that control for observed changes that may be the result of measurement error (Bartolucci, Farcomeni, and Pennoni 2010). It is thus possible to estimate the proportion of sample that remains in a given state, changes states, and “sticks” to a state once they have changed.

The latent processes estimated by the LMM indicate large stability across the two latent states of “pro-Trump” and “anti-Trump.” We find that roughly 0.71 of the sample of Republican primary voters are expected to remain in the same category from the beginning of the pre-primary season through the end of April. Of these unmoved movers, the vast majority, and the majority of the sample (0.55), were estimated to fall into the “never Trump” category (at least for the primary season). Only 0.16 of the Republican primary

¹¹To meet these assumptions, we restrict the responses to primary candidate support to “pro-Trump” (1) and “anti-Trump” (2). In this way, we maintain independence of responses across time that may be violated due to losing candidates dropping out.

voters were estimated to be “only Trump” supporters; their latent process never deviated from the first latent classification. Nearly one-third (0.29) of Republican primary voters were estimated to change candidates at least once through April and many of those changing candidates landed with Trump.

We are able to identify the conditional transition probability of a given period for the panelists, given their previous state. Table 1 presents the estimates for these movements when accounting for measurement error. On the whole, we find great stability between the two states in any given wave. Roughly 0.95 of panelists are predicted to remain in the same latent class from wave to wave. Still, we do identify that movement towards Trump away from the “anti-Trump” state is predicted to be more likely than movement away from Trump. Likewise, the results suggest that Trump supporters were slightly more likely to stick with the eventual nominee than in the “anti-Trump” state.

Table 1. Latent Markov Transition Probabilities

	Anti-Trump _t	Pro-Trump _t
Anti-Trump _{t-1}	0.950	0.050
Pro-Trump _{t-1}	0.037	0.963

While polls throughout the campaign demonstrated a near-permanence of Trump’s support, we previously had little evidence to suggest that this phenomenon occurred at the individual-level. In fact, our data demonstrate that while Trump was able to siphon off marginal voters from other candidates from month to month, those primary voters in his camp remained very loyal. Likewise, those voters who were against Trump were nearly equal in their stability of opposition. Nonetheless, over the course of the primary campaign change in support for Donald Trump did occur. To identify this change, we employ a series of multivariate analyses.

Multivariate Analysis

For the analysis of the primary months, we restrict our attention to panelists who reported that they participated in their home state’s Republican primary or caucus. The dependent variables for each month are whether the panelist intended to vote for Trump in the primaries if their state were to hold a primary or caucus on the day of the data collection.¹²

To test arguments about the composition of the Trump electorate, we estimate stacked longitudinal models and Cox proportional hazard models that exploit the multi-wave panel data. To estimate the effect of being in the white working class, we include a dichotomous indicator for race, where *white* is coded with a 1 and all other panelists are coded as 0. Income is operationalized using a five category variable based on CPS income quintiles.¹³ The baseline *income quintile* is for those panelists with an annual income above \$125,000. For education level, we employ a binary indicator where 1 corresponds to *college graduate* and 0 otherwise. *Party identification* is measured on a seven-point scale ranging from strong Democrat to strong Republican. We include a measure for the panelist’s sex, coding *female* as 1 and 0 otherwise.

We also test attitudinal explanations for Trump’s support. First, we derive a *populism* measure from the first factor of an exploratory factor analysis of fifteen items meant to capture panelists’ feelings about the individual and his relationship to the government. Panelists were provided statements, giving their level of agreement on a five-point scale. Higher values indicate more populist outlooks. Second, we create a measure for *right wing authoritarianism*

¹²We conducted a similar analysis with those panelists reporting to have voted for one of the two major party candidates in the general election. These findings and their discussion may be found in the Appendix.

¹³1= Less than \$20,000, 2=Between \$20,000 and \$50,000, 3=Between \$50,000 and \$80,000, 4=Between \$80,000 and \$125,000, 5=More than \$125,000

(*RWA*) by taking the first factor of a factor analysis for a five-item battery adopted from Altemeyer (1996). Once again, panelists provided their level of agreement to statements on a five-point scale. Higher values correspond to more authoritarian outlooks.¹⁴ Third, we measure attitudes to three minority groups: blacks, Hispanics, and Muslims. Panelists provided thermometer ratings on a 10-point scale for fourteen different social groups. *Black affect*, *Hispanic affect*, and *Muslim affect* were measured by taking the difference between the thermometer ratings for blacks, Hispanics, and Muslims and the panelist’s average rating for all other groups. Higher values correspond to warmer feelings towards blacks, Hispanics, and Muslims. Fourth, we scaled responses to ten policy preference questions to create a measure of *Liberalism*. Higher values indicate more frequent liberal responses. Survey items are described in the Appendix.¹⁵ Finally, we consider the strength of Republican partisanship (strong Republican to strong Democrat) on the traditional party identification measure.

For the primary model of support for Trump, we regress support for the eventual winner on attitudinal variables (liberalism, authoritarianism, populism, Black affect, Hispanic affect, and Muslim affect) and demographic identities (income, gender, party identification, race, and college education) using a logit link function. We “stack” the observations across the eight waves, employing fixed effects for wave and clustering the standard errors by panelist.

For the model regarding the mobility and acquisition of supporters, we implement a Cox proportional hazards model. This model is commonly used in survival analysis to assess the relationship that exists between the time that passes before a certain event occurs and risk factors or exposures. The measure of effect is the “hazard rate,” in this case interpreted as the probability of supporting Trump throughout six points in time: September, October

¹⁴Question wordings for the populism and RWA scale may be found in the Appendix.

¹⁵Descriptive statistics for our data are also included in Table ?? in the Appendix.

and November of 2015, and January, February and March of 2016. The covariates that we include as potential predictors of support are the demographic characteristics just described. Further, we also include time-varying covariates: opinions on whether Trump was qualified or not qualified to become president, and perceptions of whether Trump could win the Republican nomination. Our main effect of interest is the effect of these covariates on the decision of respondents to support Trump given that they have supported other candidates (or none) up to that point.¹⁶

Findings

Primary Season

The estimates for Trump support in the primary season from the stacked longitudinal models are shown in Table 2. In column I, we find some, but not overwhelming, evidence of a class effect during this earlier part of the campaign. To be sure, among Republican primary participants, it appears that Trump's support was not strongly related to those incomes towards the lower end of the distribution; relative to the highest quintile, all estimated coefficients in this simplified model are negative. This finding suggests that, all else equal, lower incomes were not more likely to support Trump compared to the wealthiest Republicans. Still, we do find strong support of an educational association with Trump support. Those Republican primary voters with a college degree were significantly less likely to support the eventual

¹⁶A change in candidate preference is reversible and so violates an assumption of hazards models. In our case, very few pro-Trump changes are followed by an anti-Trump change. Estimating our Cox model by excluding panelists with both pro- and anti-Trump changes does not change our interpretations.

nominee than less well educated Republicans.¹⁷ This effect is strong, but it is also most likely closely associated with attitudinal variables. Column III indicates that the inclusion of controls for attitudes reduces both the magnitude and precision of education’s effect (while keeping the negative direction).

With respect to attitudinal differences within the Republican primary electorate with respect to Trump, we identify two key predictors. First, those voters who were classified as having very strong feelings of populism were significantly more likely to support Trump than others. In April, for example, the average Trump voter scored 0.30 on the populism scale while the the average Cruz voter scored 0.09 and the average Kasich voter scored -0.03 . While the difference between the latter two candidates was not statistically distinguishable, that between Trump and the others was statistically reliable at the 95% level.

We also find support for the argument that Trump had significant support from Republican primary voters who held less positive feelings towards minorities. Although we find little support to suggest more negative feelings towards blacks was associated with support for Trump, we find marginal evidence that those Republicans who held negative feelings against Hispanics were more likely to support the Republican nominee. Furthermore, we find particularly strong evidence that those primary voters with more negative feelings towards Muslims were more likely to identify as a Trump supporter. All else equal, rating this religious minority lower than the average group rating was associated with a significant increase in the probability of voting for Trump. This effect held when including demographic characteristics, as seen in column III.

¹⁷Cross-tabulations of Trump support by college education indicate a relatively consistent gap across attainment level. In August, Trump captured roughly 26% of the non-college educated support, while only taking 17% of the college-educated. By April, both figures had increased, but the difference was roughly similar. Trump received 44% of non-college graduates, while owning 31% of college graduate support.

The estimates in Table 2 indicate that an authoritarian attitude does not predict support for Trump. The bivariate correlation between RWA and Trump support is only 0.06 and has the wrong sign. In the multivariate estimates, the RWA coefficient is never significant and has the wrong sign.

Table 2. Predicting Trump Support among Republican Primary Voters

	<i>Dependent variable: Primary Support for Trump</i>				
	I	II	III	IV	V
1st Income Quintile	-0.134 (0.288)		-0.029 (0.403)	-0.027 (0.404)	-0.027 (0.404)
2nd Income Quintile	-0.066 (0.267)		0.048 (0.355)	0.051 (0.357)	0.049 (0.357)
3rd Income Quintile	-0.055 (0.250)		0.140 (0.323)	0.142 (0.324)	0.143 (0.325)
4th Income Quintile	-0.446 (0.428)		-0.790* (0.321)	-0.791* (0.322)	-0.791* (0.323)
College Graduate	-0.564* (0.154)		-0.299 (0.201)	-0.300 (0.202)	-0.300 (0.202)
7-Point PID	-0.056 (0.049)		0.030 (0.075)	0.206** (0.098)	-0.030 (0.075)
Female	-0.269 (0.287)		-0.137 (0.202)	-0.138 (0.203)	-0.138 (0.203)
Liberalism		-0.037 (0.114)	-0.112 (0.129)	-0.112 (0.129)	-0.111 (0.129)
Populism		0.974* (0.194)	1.231* (0.205)	1.234* (0.206)	1.236* (0.206)
RWA		-0.036 (0.128)	-0.141 (0.149)	-0.143 (0.149)	-0.141 (0.149)
Black Affect		-0.049 (0.047)	-0.028 (0.049)	-0.028 (0.049)	-0.030 (0.049)
Hispanic Affect		-0.068 (0.052)	-0.098 (0.058)	-0.099 (0.058)	-0.098 (0.058)
Muslim Affect		-0.144* (0.052)	-0.135* (0.053)	-0.136* (0.053)	-0.014 (0.074)
Constant	-0.477 (0.381)	-1.829* (0.137)	-1.421* (0.542)	-0.470 (0.620)	-1.214* (0.540)
Observations	4676	3248	3001	3001	3001
Clusters	642	410	379	379	379
Log Likelihood	-2755.79	-1799.47	-1612.72	-1609.19	-1607.81
FE	x	x	x	x	x
Interaction				x	x

Note: RWA denotes right wing authoritarianism

*p<0.05

In addition to estimating pooled cross-sectional relationships, we are able to leverage our panel data to determine if the effects of certain covariates change over the course of the primary campaign. Table 3 presents the interaction effects of party identification and affect towards Muslims with the monthly fixed effects. With respect to party identification, we find that relative to August, identification as a strong Republican is less likely to be associated with a Trump supporter in almost any other month. This finding is consistent with popular narratives regarding Trump’s support. Trump’s initial base of support was more strongly drawn from independents and Republican leaners rather than from traditional strong Republicans. Over the primary season, more strong Republicans came to support Trump and this difference dissipates.

Similarly, the interactions in Table 3 present time-varying effects with respect to attitudes towards Muslims. In the earlier months of the primary season, the effect of Muslim affect was predicted to be not significantly different from the initial month among Republican primary participants. By December, however, the discriminating effect based upon attitudes significantly increases in negative magnitude. That is, the relationship between negative feelings towards Muslims and Trump supporters grew stronger over the pre-primary months.

To better understand the dynamism of these effects, consider Figure 1. We see that Independents are predicted to support Trump with roughly 0.25 probability, while strong Republicans are predicted to do so with about 0.15 probability. By the end of the primary campaign, however, this predicted probability among Republican identifiers has essentially converged near 0.40. Such a finding suggests that by the end of the campaign Donald Trump had a relatively diverse constituency with respect to partisan identification in the Republican primary electorate.

Still, there is some sorting of Republicans that occurred over the primary months on one variable directly relevant to arguments about Trump’s candidacy. In the earliest days of

Table 3. Interaction Effects


	<i>Interaction Effects</i>	
	Party ID	Muslim Affect
Base Coefficient	-0.206*	-0.014
	(0.098)	(0.074)
September	0.243*	-0.052
	(0.083)	(0.062)
October	0.171*	-0.109
	(0.080)	(0.061)
November	0.185**	-0.066
	(0.085)	(0.064)
December	0.096	-0.131
	(0.088)	(0.068)
February	0.241*	-0.158*
	(0.095)	(0.070)
March	0.226*	-0.235*
	(0.105)	(0.073)
April	0.215*	-0.179*
	(0.103)	(0.076)

Note: *p<0.05


the primary, attitudes towards Muslims did not stand out as a strong predictor of support for Donald Trump (Figure 1). We find that the predicted probability across both the most positive and the most negative primary voters was about 0.20. By the end of the primary season, those Republicans with the most negative attitudes were predicted to support Trump with a probability of roughly 0.45, while those with the most positive were predicted to so at approximately 0.25 probability. While we cannot make a causal argument regarding an inflection point, we do find the discriminating nature of this variable increases shortly after Donald Trump called for a “total and complete shutdown” of Muslims entering the United States in late November 2015.

Finally, we are also interested in seeing what drove Republican primary voters to join or resist the Trump coalition from each of our data points. More specifically, we are interested in assessing what type of respondent was more likely to start supporting Trump throughout

Figure 1. Predicted Probability of Supporting Trump: PID and Muslim Affect Interacted with Wave



(a) Support by PID



(b) Support by Muslim Affect

the campaign. The results of the Cox proportional hazards model (Table 4) demonstrate that key attitudes are related to joining or resisting Trump. First, populism is a significant predictor of support for Trump throughout the campaign. However, we can observe that the effect of most of the demographics included in the model is not distinguishable from zero at conventional levels. Furthermore, we also included two time-varying variables to assess their effect on the propensity to start supporting Trump: whether respondents consider Trump to be qualified to be president, and whether they consider Trump could win the election. The results indicate that both of these perceptions are positively associated with the propensity to support him. Figure 2 illustrates these findings. The x -axis shows the different points in time, and the y -axis the probability of *not* supporting Trump. In panel a, the two curves depict the different behaviors and risk patterns between people that considered that Trump could win and those that did not think he could win. Panel b shows the same propensity but among groups that considered he was qualified or not qualified to be president. To validate the results from this analysis, we conduct tests for proportionality that were successfully passed.¹⁸


¹⁸Another potential concern of this analysis is the violation of the assumption that all subjects in the sample will eventually experience the event of interest, even if it happens after the end of a study. In biomedical studies where survival rates are the quantity of interest, the assumption that individuals will eventually die is indeed fulfilled. Even though the assumption that all TAPS panelists will eventually support Trump is unrealistic, the Republican sample used for this analysis and the subsequent support for Trump of the majority of self-reported Republicans once he was a candidate in the general election helps to ameliorate the effects of the violation of this assumption.

Table 4. Survival analysis: factors associate with Trump support


	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Intention to vote for Trump
Female	-0.201 (0.161)
1st Income Quintile	-0.165 (0.290)
2nd Income Quintile	0.055 (0.261)
3rd Income Quintile	-0.026 (0.975)
4th Income Quintile	-0.425 (0.262)
College	-0.186 (0.160)
Liberalism	0.228* (0.104)
Authoritarianism	0.129 (0.124)
Populism	0.709* (0.492)
Black affect	0.005 (0.046)
Hispanic affect	-0.069 (0.049)
Muslim affect	-0.091* (0.039)
“He could win”	1.558* (0.355)
“He is qualified”	1.486* (0.209)
Other controls	Yes
Observations	1,536
LR Test	218.9* (df = 14)

*** p < 0.05

Figure 2. Probability of NOT supporting Trump (September 2015-March 2016) by attitudes towards him



(a) Perceptions of success: “He could win”



(b) Perceptions of qualifications: “He is qualified”

Trump Versus Cruz and Kasich

Populism, ethnic biases, and class have been found to predict Trump support among the Republican electorate, but it is unclear if these statistical relationships identify Trump as a unique Republican candidate. Traditional indicators of support, such as strength of party identification and operational liberalism, were found to have little effect on the outcome variable in pooled models. It may be that these dimensions within the Republican electorate are weak determinants of support for Trump, but they may also be strong determinants for other major candidates.

To explore whether the driving forces of Trump's support are different from other Republican candidates late in the primary season, we estimated cross-sectional models for the April wave for Trump's final two challengers: Ted Cruz and John Kasich.¹⁹ The estimates for these models are shown in Table ???. We limited the sample to include only those primary voters who reported supporting either Trump or the relevant candidate in each column. Whereas populism maintained a substantive and significant positive association with support for Trump in the primaries, unsurprisingly, we find that it has a strong, negative effect on the likelihood of supporting either Cruz and Kasich. That is, all else equal, by the end of the primaries a primary voter with relatively low populist attitudes was likely to support the establishment or Tea Party candidate. College degrees do not predict distinctive support for Cruz or Kasich, though it should be noted that the results suggest the most highly educated primary voters were slightly more likely to vote for Kasich. Similarly, positive effects exist for the subject's attitudes towards Muslims, but once again, we find that these effects are not distinct from zero for either alternative candidate. That is, while, attitudes towards Muslims

¹⁹We also estimated longitudinal models similar to those in Table 5, Column III. The results were similar to those of Table 2, suggesting that predictors of support for the final two challengers were relatively consistent.

were certainly a discriminating predictor for Trump support by the end of the campaign, we find no evidence that they were associated with any of the runners-up.

Finally, we find that operational liberalism played a significant role in support for these two alternatives. As the results indicate, Cruz performed significantly better with strong conservatives, while Kasich won the support of (relative) ideological moderates. That is, on average, supporters of these two candidates were generally on opposite sides of the traditional left-right policy space. To be sure, on a scale ranging from -2 , the least liberal, to $+1.5$, the most liberal, the mean liberalism for Kasich voters was $-.4$, while the average Cruz supporter averaged -1.1 . For Trump support, however, operational liberalism was found to be a poor predictor. In the pooled model and in an April specific estimation, support for the eventual winner was not necessarily defined by policy attitudes. On the contrary, Trump appears to have drawn from across a broad ideological spectrum of the Republican party's voters. These contrasts in predictions suggest that by the end of the primary season Trump was not operating in a different realm of other Republican party candidates. He catered to those with high levels of populism, where other candidates won the support of those who were less populist. At the same time, Trump appears to have not won systematic support on the traditional ideological spectrum in the Republican party. Cruz and Kasich were counting on unique ideological groups, but liberalism did not play as influential a role in Trump's ascendance.

What Happened to Authoritarianism?

The scholarly and popular case that Trump brought to the surface a latent authoritarianism has not been confirmed. In fact, among Republican primary voters, right wing authoritarianism does a better job of predicting Cruz supporters, who are high in authoritarianism, and Kasich supporters, who are low in authoritarianism, than it predicts Trump supporters,

Table 5. Predicting Alternative Candidate Support among Republican Primary Voters

	<i>Dependent variable: Support for ...</i>	
	Cruz	Kasich
1st Income Quintile	0.703 (0.584)	-1.658* (0.647)
2nd Income Quintile	0.016 (0.513)	-0.908 (0.466)
3rd Income Quintile	0.094 (0.492)	-0.829* (0.421)
4th Income Quintile	0.750 (0.504)	-0.331 (0.403)
College Graduate	0.201 (0.304)	0.557 (0.299)
7-Point PID	0.067 (0.106)	0.072 (0.122)
Female	0.259 (0.311)	-0.014 (0.372)
Liberalism	-0.557* (0.233)	0.730* (0.236)
Populism	-1.570* (0.295)	-1.536* (0.363)
RWA	0.168 (0.241)	0.306 (0.281)
Black Affect	0.098 (0.094)	0.078 (0.106)
Hispanic Affect	0.035 (0.099)	0.017 (0.110)
Muslim Affect	0.118 (0.076)	0.123 (0.093)
Constant	-1.396 (0.814)	-0.172 (0.857)
Observations	253	221
Log Likelihood	-144.82	-113.60

*p<0.05

who fall between Cruz and Kasich supporters on the authoritarianism scale. The simple correlation between Trump/not Trump and authoritarianism in April 2016 was 0.06, but was 0.14 for Cruz/not Cruz and -0.19 for Kasich/not Kasich. A reasonable hypothesis is that authoritarianism is closely associated with conservatism, but conservatism and strength of party identification do a better job of predicting candidate preferences among Republicans (Feldman 2003, Perez and Hetherington 2014). Among Republican primarygoers the association between right wing authoritarianism and our measure of operational liberalism is moderately strong and negative, -0.40 , indicating those with authoritarian attitudes are also likely to provide conservative policy preferences. At the same time, populism is weakly associated with the traditional left-right scale (correlation of -0.10), while maintaining a somewhat stronger association with right wing authoritarianism ($+0.24$).

We further explore the relationship between authoritarianism and candidate support by replicating our panel model in column 3 of Table 2 with the omission of partisanship and operational liberalism. These variables are highly collinear with the right wing authoritarianism measure and may be absorbing whatever effect it exerts on candidate choice. Yet, as the first column of Table 6 demonstrates, removing those variables provides little evidence that right wing authoritarianism was a strong predictor of support for Trump over the course of the Republican primary. The absence of evidence of a relationship between authoritarianism and Trump support does not appear to be the result of collinearity with ideology and partisanship.

Another hypothesis regarding the lack of an effect to this point may be the nature of our operationalization of authoritarianism. We employ a strategy that focuses on right wing authoritarianism in the tradition of Altemeyer (1996) that attempts to distinguish itself from left-wing authoritarianism of attitudinal. Yet, as Feldman (2003) and Stenner (2005) note, this distinction is weak and perhaps insufficiently different from conservatism. In

response to these issues, others argue in favor of measuring authoritarianism with a battery of questions regarding the nature of child-rearing, as asked in the ANES, that is disconnected from contemporary politics. The use of this four-item scale is widely accepted and found to be a strong predictor of attitudes theoretically associated with authoritarian personalities (see Feldman 2003, Stenner 2005, Hetherington and Weiler 2009, Perez and Hetherington 2014).

This four-item battery also was asked on TAPS. In April of 2016, bivariate correlations between the four-item authoritarian measure and support for Trump is weak (+0.09), but in the predicted direction, and is weak as a predictor of support for Cruz (+0.09). The relationship with Kasich, who attracted the support of more moderate Republicans, was found to be much more negative (-0.19). When included in the multivariate model for Trump support, the authoritarianism coefficient is positive but not statistically significant, as displayed in column II of Table 6.

While both measures authoritarian disposition fail to predict Trump support among Republican primary voters, there is a relationship between Trump/Clinton vote in the November 2016 general election and RWA (Table 6, column III). With the large range of panelists in the general election estimates, RWA, which is related to conservatism, has some predictive value. However, child rearing authoritarianism, which is claimed to have little or no political meaning, is not significant in the general election estimates (column IV). Again, the evidence that authoritarianism was a powerful force in shaping American political divisions is weak at best.

Table 6. Predicting Trump Support among Republican Primary Voters

	<i>Dependent variable: Support for Trump</i>			
	<i>Primary</i>		<i>General</i>	
	I	II	III	IV
1st Income Quintile	-0.053 (0.387)	-0.142 (0.372)	1.539 (0.843)	1.457* (0.792)
2nd Income Quintile	0.008 (0.336)		-0.085 (0.848)	0.888 (0.788)
0.696		0.121 (0.310)	0.074 (0.300)	-0.483 (0.890)
3rd Income Quintile	-0.782* (0.310)	-0.800* (0.303)	0.844 (0.669)	0.583 (0.670)
4th Income Quintile	-0.339 (0.194)	-0.236 (0.197)	-0.401 (0.529)	-0.685 (0.453)
College Graduate	-0.137 (0.192)	-0.083 (0.190)	-0.931 (0.491)	-0.678 (0.501)
Female	1.169* (0.191)	1.161* (0.188)	0.028 (0.178)	0.242 (0.177)
Populism	-0.102 (0.132)		1.128* (0.354)	
RWA		0.197 (0.131)		0.496 (0.382)
Child Rearing Authoritarianism	-0.028 (0.049)	-0.032 (0.050)	-0.147 (0.117)	-0.123 (0.120)
Black Affect	-0.117* (0.056)	-0.116* (0.056)	-0.019 (0.106)	-0.033 (0.101)
Hispanic Affect	-0.134* (0.049)	-0.110* (0.048)	-0.062 (0.125)	-0.136 (0.118)
Muslim Affect			0.705* (0.142)	0.686* (0.151)
7-Point PID			-2.155* (0.370)	-2.279* (0.337)
Liberalism			1.387* (0.545)	1.101 (0.576)
White	-1.469* (0.343)	-1.503* (0.332)	-3.410* (1.088)	-3.084* (1.097)
Constant				
Observations	3,175	3,167	783	775
Clusters	403	402		
Log Likelihood	-1716.16	-1718.56	-168.78	-174.02
FE	x	x		

Note: RWA denotes right wing authoritarianism

*p<0.05

Conclusion

Why did Donald Trump win the Republican primary nomination? Pundits and scholars thought his candidacy was unlikely to be successful. He deviated from the standard Republican message. His public speeches would typically have been considered gaffes. He was unable to garner support from the Republican National Party or the standard political elites. Pundit expectations, as well as scholarly ones, were that this candidate was not one to be taken seriously. Yet, a careful look at the empirical data during the primary campaign would suggest that Trump's candidacy followed standard patterns. He took an early lead, built upon his early advantages, and created a different coalition by the end of the primaries than that propelled him into the early events.

We have exploited an original data set to characterize the foundation of Trump's support. Our findings suggest that support may be characterized differently over the course of the pre-primary and primary season. We hypothesized that factors such as authoritarianism, populism, racism, and class promoted his early candidacy. We found that authoritarianism did not play a significant role, at least in a national sample, but found evidence for populism, bias against Muslims, and working class status. We also found marginal evidence that his earliest primary supporters were less strongly identified with the Republican party than other participants in Republican primaries. By the end of the primaries, this relationship to party identification dissipated, while affect towards Muslims increased in its association with Trump support. A proportional hazard model confirmed the importance of populism for switching to Trump, while beliefs regarding his qualifications and ability to win in November also influenced the outcome variable.

We want to draw special attention to our findings on authoritarianism. While education, populism, and anti-Muslim bias, and, to a lesser degree, anti-Hispanic bias, promoted

support for Trump during the primary season, authoritarianism, as usually measured, did not. Consistent with the findings of Rahn and Oliver for mid-March 2016, Trump supporters were somewhat authoritarian but that did not distinguish them from other Republicans on average. Populism, rooted in concerns that the system is stacked against the “little guy,” was far more important. We also find that Trump was unique in that the determinants of his support were more distinct from the traditional left-right dimension than other Republican primary candidates.

Trump’s advantages appeared to have stemmed from quite traditional election forces—issue positions associated with populism, economic class, and ethnic bias. For some observers, this adds up to a modern nativism that represents an important new feature of the Republican coalition. However, evidence that it represents the special appeal of Trump’s messages and style to a certain personality type was not found.

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Appendix

Populism

Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

1. The politicians in Congress need to follow the will of the people.
2. Judges frequently hinder the work of presidents, and they should be ignored.
3. The government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves.
4. Our presidents should have the necessary power so that they can act in favor of the national interest.
5. The people, and not the politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.
6. Our presidents should do what the people want even when the laws prohibit him from doing it.
7. Elected politicians sell out to big business.
8. What our country needs is a strong, determined president who will crush evil and set us on the right path again.
9. Big corporations accumulate wealth by exploiting the people.
10. Politicians are actually interested in what people like me think.
11. Our politics is hostage to the interests of a military-industrial complex.
12. Our presidents should obey the laws even when the people don't like it.
13. Politicians should follow rather than lead the people.
14. Our political system has been corrupted.
15. I prefer politicians who I feel like I could get to know as a person.

Right Wing Authoritarianism

Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

1. There is no one right way to live life; everybody has to create their own way.
2. Our country needs free thinkers who will have the courage to defy traditional ways, even if this upsets many people.
3. The old-fashioned ways and old-fashioned values still show the best way to live.
4. Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the 'rotten apples' who are ruining everything.
5. What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil and take us back to our true path.

Liberalism

Do you generally support or oppose

1. increasing taxes on wealth individuals
2. federal Common Core standards for schools
3. allowing illegal immigrants to eventually be eligible for U.S. citizenship
4. gun control legislation
5. same-sex marriage
6. a woman's right to an abortion
7. building the Keystone XL oil pipeline
8. repealing the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare)
9. federal regulation of greenhouse gas emissions
10. using U.S. ground troops to fight ISIS in Iraq and Syria

Child Rearing Authoritarianism

Please tell us which one you think is more important for children to have:

1. independence or respect for elders
2. curiosity or good manners
3. obedience or self-reliance
4. being considerate or being well-behaved

General Election

When we move from the primary season to the general election, Trump's support among Republicans blossoms and populism fades as a distinctive feature of the Trump coalition. To estimate support during the general election, we limit our analysis to one wave of data: November 2016. We estimate the probability of voting for Donald Trump using a logit link function. To test the hypothesis regarding the relationship between the white working class and support for Donald Trump, we also subset our data by white respondents, attempting to identify effects regarding income quintile and educational status on the probability of voting for Trump. Table ?? presents these results. First, while the strength of party identification and operational ideology were both inconsistent predictors of support in the primary, unsurprisingly, they prove to be influential covariates for all (two-party) voters in November. To be sure, of those voting for one of the two major party candidates, 88 percent of Democrats voted for Clinton and 92 percent of Republicans in the sample voted for Trump. Policy preferences also strongly predict candidate preference. More liberal panelists were less likely to vote for the current president. Finally, we also find that gender was a significant predictor of vote choice in the general election, while it was not so among Republican primary voters. Women were significantly more likely to support Clinton than they were to vote for Trump.

Populism was associated with Trump support among Republicans during the primary season, but it lacks the effect in November. Rather, right wing authoritarianism is a stronger

predictor of vote choice in November, even controlling for party and ideology. We also find that racial attitudes are weaker predictors within the general election. Muslim affect is a strong predictor in the primary model, but when controlling for party identification, liberalism, and authoritarianism among the general electorate, we find this effect dissipates. Hence, it is difficult to argue that racial attitudes had an effect independent of party and ideology on Trump support in the general election. Still we do find marginal support that negative attitudes towards blacks are associated with support for Trump in the general election.

Finally, we further investigate the dynamics of class and Trump support in the November election. In the first column of Table ??, we find that lower income quintiles were significantly more likely to support Donald Trump in the general election than those panelists who were located in the wealthiest category. Furthermore, we find strong evidence that education is strongly related to Trump support. Those panelists with a college degree were significantly more likely to vote for Clinton than the Republican, all else equal. Finally, we find strong evidence that white voters, while controlling for a series of other covariates were significantly more likely to vote for Trump. Each of these findings would appear to be consistent with the argument that Trump drew heavy support from the white working class.

We also subset our data with just white panelists who reported voting for one of the two major party candidates. The models predict mostly the same effects. Among whites, party identification exerts a strong, positive influence on vote choice. Similarly, more conservative policy preferences are highly predictive of voting for Trump over Clinton. Right wing authoritarianism also maintains its strong relationship with the outcome variable.

Supplementary Tables

Table 7. Predicting Trump Support among General Election Voters

	<i>Dependent variable: General Election, All</i>			<i>Dependent variable: General Election, White</i>		
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
1st Income Quintile	1.675* (0.644)		1.539 (0.843)	0.324 (0.455)		-1.182 (0.862)
2nd Income Quintile	1.824* (0.689)		0.889 (0.848)	0.706 (0.424)		-1.125 (0.739)
3rd Income Quintile	0.788 (0.589)		-0.483 (0.890)	0.570 (0.401)		-0.702 (0.696)
4th Income Quintile	0.838 (0.543)		0.844 (0.669)	0.139 (0.441)		-0.920 (0.703)
College Graduate	-0.670* (0.333)		-0.401 (0.529)	-0.775* (0.258)		-0.514 (0.439)
7-Point PID	0.896* (0.089)		0.705* (0.142)	0.853* (0.078)		0.477* (0.124)
Female	-0.231 (0.316)		-0.931 (0.491)	-0.060 (0.255)		0.323 (0.432)
White	1.128* (0.316)		1.387* (0.545)			
Liberalism		-2.248* (0.326)	-2.155* (0.370)		-2.665* (0.282)	-2.361 (0.312)
Populism		0.041 (0.181)	0.028 (0.178)		0.608* (0.266)	0.562* (0.283)
RWA		0.921* (0.312)	1.128* (0.354)		0.788* (0.284)	0.834* (0.344)
Black Affect		-0.234* (0.107)	-0.147 (0.117)		0.199 (0.133)	0.141 (0.184)
Hispanic Affect		-0.048 (0.161)	-0.019 (0.106)		-0.190 (0.162)	-0.203 (0.218)
Muslim Affect		-0.159 (0.152)	-0.062 (0.125)		-0.233* (0.114)	-0.231 (0.127)
Constant	-0.477 (0.381)	-2.664* (0.520)	-3.410* (1.088)	-3.206* (0.479)	-0.067 (0.236)	-0.969 (0.823)
Observations	1109	835	783	887	664	630
Log Likelihood	-392.85	-202.38	-168.78	-332.18	-135.91	-112.67

Note: RWA denotes right wing authoritarianism

*p<0.05

Table 8. Republican Primary Electorate Means

	All Voters	April Trump	April Cruz	April Kasich
1st Income Quintile	0.144	0.147	0.160	0.100
2nd Income Quintile	0.202	0.237	0.201	0.146
3rd Income Quintile	0.272	0.268	0.278	0.215
4th Income Quintile	0.238	0.219	0.225	0.292
5th Income Quintile	0.144	0.130	0.136	0.246
White	0.904	0.900	0.899	0.942
Female	0.435	0.386	0.438	0.403
College Graduate	0.501	0.415	0.489	0.701
7-Point PID	5.671	5.604	5.938	5.514
Liberalism	-0.816	-0.892	-1.130	0.426
Populism	0.185	0.407	0.062	-0.035
RWA	0.467	0.516	0.626	0.212
Black Affect (-9 to 9)	1.210	0.927	1.444	1.262
Hispanic Affect (-9 to 9)	1.209	1.089	1.423	1.240
Muslim Affect (-9 to 9)	-1.565	-1.997	-1.602	-1.266
Observations	685	236	176	144